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1 Introduction
Formal mereology should be of interest to metaphysicians because it allows us, in
a rigorous way, to determine the consequence relations between metaphysical the-
ses and theories, many of which are of metaphysical interest. Take, for example,
the many and various puzzles of constitution, and the metaphysical theories that
have been advanced to solve them. Ideally, it should be possible to analyse these
puzzles and their solutions in a formal way — to describe, for example, the puzzle
of Dion and Theon, or of the statue and the clay, as a set of logically inconsistent
propositions in a formal mereological language. By doing that we could more
easily explore the space of possible solutions, since every solution would consist
in denying one of those propositions. Ideally, it should be possible to state some
(but not all) of the content of metaphysical theories concerning the part-whole
relation formally, and that would enable us to better evaluate objections to those
theories, since it would give us procedures for determining what is and what isn’t
a consequence of such a theory. Formal mereology is a great tool, and it should
be used.
Unfortunately, existing formal mereology is not well-geared to this. The best
understood mereology — classical mereology — is way too strong. Its theorems
contain principles that are themselves matters of metaphysical debate, and so it
cannot be used in a neutral way to determine what the logical relationships are be-
tween participants in those debates. Much discussion in the literature sees some
authors offering philosophical objections to classical mereology, and others resist-
ing those objections.
What we would like would be a neutral, or minimal mereology whose theo-
rems are only those truths that are analytic, or conceptual truths of the mereologi-
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cal concepts, or at least widely accepted among rival metaphysical positions. Note
that I say “only” here, not “all and only” — there may well be conceptual truths of
the mereological concepts that are not formalisable in the style of a formal mereol-
ogy — conceptual truths linking mereological concepts to other, non-mereological
concepts for example. Also note that I am not saying that a minimal mereology
should be completely certain and immune to any philosophical controversy — that
is impossible as philosophers will no doubt disagree about which are conceptual
truths of mereology as well as about which are the metaphysical ones. But that
should not stop us from trying. I at least would like to have a formal tool that
allows me to represent not only my own metaphysical thinking about mereology
but the thinking of those I disagree with as well, and I think I can do that.
In this paper I describe what seems to me to be a minimal mereology of this
kind. It is neutral on a number of issues that classical mereology settles: on the
circumstances under which some collection of things have a fusion, for example;
and, importantly, on the question of mereological extensionality — on whether
there can be two things, so to speak, “made of the same stuff”. Though there are
mereologies in the literature that attempt this,1 they all have drawbacks, the nature
of which will become clear when compared with my view, I think. The mereology
I describe is an atemporal one — it regards the part-whole relation as two-place,
and has no explicit representation of times or change of parts over time. This
may seem to be metaphysically partisan — in my view, however, the best way
to represent metaphysical theories on which the part-whole relation holds only at
a time, and not simpliciter, is by modifying a theory of the kind I describe here,
so that finding an atemporal minimal mereology is the first step towards finding a
way to be neutral between atemporal and temporal approaches.2
2 SPO and its extensions
It is best to begin in medias res and lay out the details of my preferred mini-
mal non-extensional mereology, SPO. In my view, this theory captures all the the
formal conceptual truths of the mereological relation — a weaker system would
allow some models that are mereologically incoherent; a stronger one would ban
some models that are not incoherent. SPO is the first order theory with the fol-
1Casati and Varzi’s “Minimal mereology”, for example. (Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 39) (Varzi
2009)
2I hope to say more about this in a later paper.
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lowing axioms and definitions:
x < x (Refl)
x < y∧ y < z→ x < z (Trans)
x◦ y⇔ (∃z)(z < x∧ z < y) (Def◦)
¬x < y→ (∃z)(z < x∧¬z◦ y) (SSP)
(I use the symbol⇔ for “is equivalent by definition”. Definitions containing
⇔, such as Def◦, are to be understood as abbreviated rules to the effect that any
sentence may be re-writtten eliminating the symbol being defined. I want to be
able to mention definitions in order to say that they are or are not admissible in
such and such a theory. Alternative symbols for definition, such as ≡d f , suggest
that it is being stipulated that a definition is admissible, whereas I want to be able
to refer to definitions without stipulating that they are admissible).
“SPO” stands for supplementary pre-ordering, which is my name for the type
of relation < that satisfies these axioms. “Pre-ordering” is a standard name for re-
lations that are both transitive (satisfy Trans) and reflexive (satisfy Refl); a “sup-
plementary” relation is one that satisfies the strong supplementation principle,
SSP. The intended interpretion of SPO is that < is to mean “is part of” and ◦ is
to mean “mereologically overlaps” (or “has a part in common with”).3 So inter-
preted, SPO says that the part-whole relation is reflexive, transitive, and supple-
mentary.
The idea that part-whole should be transitive is familiar from the literature.
My toe is part of my foot, my foot is part of me, therefore my toe is part of me.
I shall not defend or question it further here.4 So to is the idea that part-whole
should be reflexive. It is a terminological convention in the literature that each
individual counts as its own part. There is also a perfectly good sense of “part”
in which no individual is its own part — that sense is called “proper part”, and is
interdefinable with the reflexive relation we are focusing on.5
That leaves the idea that part-whole should be supplementary — i.e. that it
should satisfy the SSP axiom. SSP encodes what is (I believe) an essential and
distinctive feature of our mereological concepts: that if x is not part of y, then
some part of x is disjoint from (i.e. does not overlap with) y. To make this seem
3The concept of overlap is needed to make the axiom SSP less cumbersome, and more recog-
nisable (SSP is usually formulated in this way in the literature), and it will also come in handy
when we describe some extensions of SPO.
4For further discussion of the question of whether the part-whole relation is transitive, see
Simons (1987, pp. 107-108).
5Beware! I here sweep under the carpet some issues about the definition of “proper part” that
will return to bite us in section 3.1.
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plausible, consider the following argument by cases: first suppose that x and y are
disjoint. Then x itself is the part of x that is disjoint from y, so SSP is satisfied.
Now suppose that x and y overlap. If x overlaps, but is not part of y, then there are
two possibilities: either y is part of x (as shown in the diagram on the left), or x
and y “merely overlap” (as shown in the diagram on the right):
x y x y
Either way, we would like to say, there is some of x not in y — some part of x,
that is, not part of y. So, no matter how x and y are related, mereologically speak-
ing, SSP is satisfied. So it is reasonable to suppose that the part-whole relation is
supplementary.
SPO is a non-extensional mereology. It allows for two individuals to coincide
— to be “made of exactly the same stuff”. As we will see in section 3, it is a
controversial matter exactly how this relation of coincidence should be explained
in terms of part-whole. For present purposes, we will say that individuals coincide
iff they are parts of each other. That is, if we write x ∼ y for “x and y coincide”,
then coincidence may be defined as shown in MPC (for mutual parthood definition
of coincidence) below:
x∼ y⇔ x < y∧ y < x (MPC)
Note that each individual coincides with itself, because the part-whole relation
is reflexive. This is so even in an extensional mereology. What makes SPO non-
extensional is that it allows that two individuals coincide with each other; or to
put it another way, it allows that there are cases of proper coincidence, where for
x and y to properly coincide is for x and y to coincide while being numerically
distinct.
MPC may seem an odd way to define coincidence, but in the setting of SPO
it makes perfect sense. Say that x and y are mereologically equivalent iff they
occupy, so to speak, the same position in the mereological heirarchy — iff they
stand in all and only the same purely mereological relations to every other indi-
vidual.6 Since all mereological relations are definable in terms of the part-whole
6A purely mereological relation is one definable in terms of part-whole alone. Identity, for
example, is not purely mereological, since if it was, no two things would count as mereologically
equivalent. Similarly, the relation of non-identical parthood defined in section 3 is not purely
mereological, as it can only be defined in terms of part-whole and identity, not in terms of part-
whole alone. In contrast, strict parthood (as defined in section 3) as well as overlap and disjointness
are all purely mereological relations.
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relation, x and y are mereologically equivalent iff they stand in all and only the
same part-whole relations to every other individual; i.e. iff they have all and only
the same parts and are parts of all and only the same things. Trans says that if x
is part of y, then whatever is part of x is part of y; therefore, if x and y are parts
of each other, then they must have all and only the same parts. For similar rea-
sons, if x and y are parts of each other, then they must be part of all and only the
same things. Therefore, if x and y are mutual parts, then they are mereologically
equivalent. Conversely, if x and y are mereologically equivalent, then they have
all and only the same parts; since, by Refl, y is part of itself, y must be part of x,
and by the same reasoning x part of y. Therefore, if x and y are mereologically
equivalent, then they are mutual parts.
What we have just seen is that, on the assumption only of Trans and Refl, mu-
tual parthood is mereological equivalence. If it is possible for two things to be
mereologically equivalent (and, in SPO, it is), then it seems reasonable to define
coincidence as mereological equivalence — and that is equivalent to defining co-
incidence as mutual parthood. That is the key insight behind the mutual parthood
tradition in non-extensional mereology.
But is it possible for two things to coincide in SPO? Yes; to verify this, con-
sider the following simple finite model: let there be two mereological atoms, and
two composites, both of which have all four individuals as parts, as shown in the
Hasse diagram7 in figure 1 below. It can easily be verified that this model satisfies
Figure 1: A model of SPO with coincidence
all the axioms of SPO. In this model, the two composite objects coincide.
The model shown in figure 2, however, which appears similar to figure 1, is
7A Hasse diagram is a convenient way of visualising a finite pre-ordered set. Members of
the domain (for our purposes, individuals) are shown as dots. Lines on the diagram represent
the pre-ordering relation (for our purposes, the relation of part to whole). x stands in the pre-
ordering relation to y (i.e. x is part of y) iff there is any way of reaching x from y by travelling
only downward or horizontally along the lines. Reachability is transitive, and each node is reach-
able from itself, so the diagrams assume that they are representing a pre-ordered set, but not that
the set is supplementary. Thus they are useful for visualing both models of and non-models of
SPO. (Strictly speaking these are “extended Hasse diagrams” — extended with a convention for
depicting pre-ordered sets, rather than just posets).
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not a model of SPO, as it fails to satisfy SSP. The two composite object on the left
is not a part of the one on the right, but has no part which fails to overlap the com-
posite object on the right. The impossibility of this model is a typical feature of
mereological theories that contain SSP. (Simons 1987, pp. 28-29) Also, note that
the model of figure 2 does not feature any coincidence in the sense in which coin-
cidence was defined above; the two composite individuals are not mereologically
equivalent, as each one has a part the other lacks, namely itself.
Figure 2: A non-model of SPO
It is also possible, in SPO, for non-composite individuals to coincide. Con-
sider the model in which there are exactly two individuals, which are parts of each
other, and nothing else, as shown in figure 3. It is again easy to verify that this
satisfies all the axioms of SPO.
Figure 3: A model of SPO with coincidence between atoms
I expect that this type of model will raise interesting philosophical issues. First
issue: is it plausible that two mereological atoms may coincide? I don’t see why
this is any worse than the usual philosophical examples of coincidence (persons
and their bodies; statues and the clay they are made of). It’s easy to imagine the
usual philosophical examples taking place on the subatomic level. Ignore for a
moment the fact that protons are composite individuals made up of quarks, and
imagine that they are simple bodies, as Rutherford supposed. Now consider a hy-
drogen atom that becomes ionised by having its electron annihilated. Chemical
atoms, it seems reasonable, become ions, they are not destroyed in the process
of ionisation. But a hydrogen ion is constituted by a lone proton; before being
ionised both the hydrogen atom and the proton existed, and were distinct; nei-
ther, it seems reasonable to say, have been destroyed; after the ionisation there
is no mereological difference between them; therefore, after the ionisation two
things coincide.8 Since we are pretending that protons are mereological atoms,
8This is a subatomic version of Chrysippus’s puzzle of Dion and Theon (Burke 1994); or
van Inwagen’s Descartes and Descartes-minus; (van Inwagen 1981); or Geach’s Tibbles and Tib
(Wiggins 1968).
6
two mereological atoms coincide.
This argument is hardly watertight; but it seems no worse than arguments for
coincidence on the basis of persons or cats losing parts of their bodies, which it
resembles. Arguments for coincidence at the subatomic level are no worse than
analogous arguments at the macroscopic level. So there is no particular reason
that I can see to reject coincidence between mereological atoms while allowing it
between composites.
Second issue: by what right do I describe the model shown in figure 3 as a
case of coincidence between atoms anyway? Isn’t an atom something that has
no parts other than itself? The elements of the model in question both have parts
other than themselves; ergo they are not atoms.
What I meant by “mereological atom” when I said that SPO allows for co-
incidence between atoms was “something that has no parts that do not coincide
with it”. In that sense, the elements of the model in question are atoms. But what
makes my definition of “atom” the right one, and the definition of the previous
paragraph the wrong one? I will be able to answer this question later in this pa-
per (see section 3.3). What has been established now, however, is that the model
of figure 3 is a model of SPO, however we describe it in natural mereological
language.
2.1 Extensional mereology and beyond
SPO is my attempt at a minimal mereology; a fortiori, it is a weak mereology,
much weaker than classical mereology, and weaker than the minimal extensional
mereologies found in the literature. Stronger mereologies than SPO, in my view,
include among their theorems some material that is philosophically controversial.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how to formulate some familiar and/or inter-
esting stronger mereologies by adding axioms to SPO.
The first axiom we might add is ASym, below:
x < y∧ y < x→ x = y (ASym)
ASym says that < is anti-symmetric. Relations that are anti-symmetric, reflexive,
and transitive are called “partial orderings”, and the theory that results from adding
ASym to SPO may be called SO, or the theory of supplementary orderings. SO
is an extensional mereology; in SO, it is impossible for two things to coincide (as
follows obviously from ASym together with the definition of coincidence, MPC).
It is equivalent to Varzi’s (2009) EM.
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SO is still weaker than classical mereology however. A famous feature of
classical mereology is its so called “principle of unrestricted composition”, or
general sum principle which says that any non-empty collection of individuals
has a “mereological sum”, or “fusion”. To state this principle formally requires
more than the normal resources of first-order logic, as the quantification over “col-
lections” in the previous sentence would suggest. Some authors treat collections
as sets, making classical mereology an extension of set theory; others change the
underlying logic from first-order to first-order plural or second-order logic; I shall
use the popular schematic approach (Simons 1987, p. 38) in which the principle
is presented as a schema using a schematic variable in place of quantification over
“collections”. The general sum principle (GSP) may thus be stated:9
(∃z)(Φ)→ (∃x)(∀y)(x◦ y↔ (∃z)(Φ∧ y◦ z)) (GSP)
The theory whose axioms are those of SO, plus ASym and GSP is classical
mereology. Following the naming scheme I used for SPO and SO, however, it
might called the theory of sum-complete supplementary orderings (SSO), where
“sum-complete” refers to the formal property that a relation < has when it satisfies
GSP, such as “supplementary” refers to the formal property of satisfying SSP.
We could also add GSP directly to SPO, without adding ASym. This would
produce the theory of sum-complete supplementary pre-orderings (SSPO), which
is weaker than classical mereology (SSO), but stronger than SPO. SSPO closely
resembles classical mereology, except that it allows for coincidence, and does not
require that a non-empty collection of individuals have a unique sum. Any two
sums of the same collection of individuals, however, must coincide.10
2.2 SPO-models as posets
There is a special relationship between the theories SPO and SO, which makes it
easy to reason about SPO and its extensions if you are used to reasoning about
SO and its extensions. While every model of SO is a model of SPO, there is also
9Paul Hovda has recently called attention to some different possible meanings of “fusion”, and
correspondingly different formulations of GSP-like principles. My version of GSP says, in effect,
that for any satisfiable sentence Φ, there is what Hovda (2009, p. 58) calls a “Type-1 fusion”
of those things that satisfy Φ. The differences between different definitions of summation (i.e.
between “types” of “fusion”) that Hovda calls attention to, however, need not trouble us because
we have assumed the strong supplementation principle (SSP) from the start, and formulations of
GSP using different types of fusion are are equivalent if SSP is assumed. (Hovda 2009, p. 70)
10The easiest way to prove these facts about SSPO is via the technique described in the following
section.
8
a sense in which every model of SPO is also a model of SO. Taking advantage of
this fact can make it easier to feel at home with non-extensional mereology if you
are used to extensional mereologies.
Models of SPO are pre-ordered sets, pairs of a domain D (of individuals)
and a reflexive transitive relation <. It turns out that every such structure can be
represented without loss of information by a partially ordered set, or poset, which
is a pair of a domain and a reflexive anti-symmetric transitive relation.11
Let [x] be an abbreviation for {y ∈ D : y < x and x < y}— the set of all indi-
viduals coincident with x. It follows that [x] = [y] iff (x < y and y < x) — that x
and y belong to the same such set iff they coincide.
Now let the poset representation of 〈D,<〉 be the pair 〈D′,<′〉 where:
D′ = {[x] : x ∈ D}
[x]<′ [y] iff x < y
Putting this in words: the elements of the poset representation of an SO-model
are sets of coincident individuals, and the ordering relation is the relation that
holds between two such sets iff members of one are parts of the members of the
other.
It’s easy to see that <′ is reflexive and transitive if < is. Also, <′ is anti-
symmetric even if < is not, since if [x] <′ [y] and [y] <′ [x], then x < y and y < x
(by the definition of <′) and then [x] = [y] (by the definition of [...]). So 〈D′,<′〉
is a poset.
If an identity-free sentence of our mereological language — a sentence whose
only predicates are < and ◦ — is true in the model 〈D,<〉, then it is true in its
poset representation 〈D′,<′〉, and vice versa.12 SSP is an identity-free sentence;
so it is true in a model iff it is true in that model’s poset representation. So the
poset representations of SPO models are SO models. For similar reasons, the
poset representations of SSPO models are SSO models (i.e. models of classical
mereology).
The upshot of all this is that if you want to check whether whether a structure
is a model of SPO, it’s easy to do this by checking whether its poset representa-
tion is a model of SO (which is a fairly well-understood extensional mereology).
11For a similar application of this feature of pre-orders, see Cotnoir (2010, p. 403-405).
12I won’t go through the proof here, but it would proceed by induction over the structure of
sentences, with the base clause of the induction relying on the fact that [x] <′ [y] iff x < y. The
restriction to identity-free sentences is needed because the sets [x] and [y] may be identical when
the individuals x and y are distinct.
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Likewise, if you want to check whether something is a model of SSPO, you can
do that by checking whether its poset representation is a model of SSO (which is
the extremely well-understood classical mereology).13
I find it much easier to think in extensional terms than non-extensional. I do
not think that I am unusual — often opposition to non-extensional mereologies
is derived less from philosophical objections than from a feeling that the clear
structure of classical mereology is slipping away into the fog. But we should not
feel foggy about SPO (still less SSPO) for they are closely related to extensional
mereologies, differing from them only in more than one individual is permitted to
occupy each place in the mereological network.
2.3 Axiomatisation in terms of overlap
There is something unlovely about the axiomatic basis of SPO with which I intro-
duced it. The axioms Refl and Trans are stated in terms of the primitive predicate
<, but the SSP axiom contains both < and the defined predicate ◦. It would be
nice if we could state the whole theory without having to use any definitions. Of
course this could be done by writing SSP in primitive notation — just expanding
out the occurence of ◦ in it. That, however, just makes SSP verbose and hard(er)
to understand, and hard to recognise as the principle named by Simons.
There is however, another elegant way to axiomatise SPO without any defi-
nitions, and it is a way that sheds some light on the significance of SSP. Let the
theory O (for theory of overlap) be the first order theory with the following ax-
ioms:
x◦ x (ORefl)
x◦ y→ y◦ x (OSym)
x◦ y→ (∃z)(∀w)(w◦ z→ (w◦ x∧w◦ y)) (OP)
The axioms of O are supposed to capture conceptual truths of the concept of
mereological overlap that was defined in SPO. ORefl and OSym are particularly
obvious (each thing is a part of itself, so each thing overlaps itself; if x and y have
a common part, then y and x have a common part). OP, the overlap principle, is
a bit more interesting. It says that if two things overlap, then there is something
13A corollary of this applies to Hasse diagrams. Take a Hasse diagram, and for each pair of
dots linked by a horizontal line, move those two dots on top of each other, so that they look like
one. Then you have the Hasse diagram of the poset representation of the model represented by
the original Hasse diagram. If what you now have is a model of SO (/SSO), then what you started
with was a model of SPO (/SSPO).
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they, so to speak, overlap on. If x and y overlap, then there’s something that if you
overlap it, then you overlap x and y both. You can think of this as saying, using
only the language of overlap, that if two things overlap, then they have a common
part. ORefl, OSym, and OP are all theorems of SPO.14
This is all very well, but not much use unless we can define “is part of” in
terms of “overlap”. The following definition is frequently used in mereologies
that take overlap as their primitive:
x < y⇔ (∀z)(z◦ x→ z◦ y) (Def<)
Let us call the theory that results from adding Def< to O, O+. O+ is the same
theory as SPO.15 So SPO has an axiomatic basis in which ◦ is the primitive, and
< is defined in a standard way for such bases.
14The proofs of ORefl and OSym are trivial, and already alluded to in the text above. The proof
of OP in SPO forms part of the proof given in the following footnote that O+ and SPO are the
same theory.
15To show that this is the case, I first show that both of the definitions, Def< and Def ◦, are
admissible in both theories, then that each of the axioms of O+ is a theorem of SPO, and then that
each of the axioms of SPO is a theorem of O+.
Def< is admissible in SPO. Proof: (a) The left-to-right direction of Def< is a consequence of
Trans and Def◦. If z ◦ x, then there is some common part of both, w. If x < y, then by Trans, w
is part of y. So w is a part of both y and z, so z ◦ y. (b) Now take the right-to-left direction of
Def<. We will prove the contrapositive, ¬x < y→ (∃z)(z◦ x∧¬z◦ y), by conditional proof. Start
by supposing that ¬x < y. (c) By SSP, there is some z such that z < x but ¬z◦ y. (d) Since z < x,
z◦ x (using Def◦ and Refl). (e) Therefore (∃z)(z◦ x∧¬z◦ y), and we have proven the contraposed
form we set out to.
Def◦ is admissible in O+. Proof: (a) Start by expanding the right-hand-side of Def◦ using
Def<. This gives us
x◦ y⇔ (∃z)((∀w)(w◦ z→ w◦ x)∧ (∀w)(w◦ z→ w◦ y))
which can be simplified to:
x◦ y⇔ (∃z)(∀w)(w◦ z→ (w◦ x∧w◦ y))
The left-to-right direction of Def◦ can thus be seen to be equivalent to OP.
(b) Now to prove the right-to-left direction. We proceed by conditional proof. Suppose there
are some x, y and z such that (∀w)(w◦ z→ w◦ x∧w◦ y). (c) Instantiating the formula of (b) with
z gives us z◦ z→ z◦x∧ z◦y; but by ORefl, z◦ z; so z◦x. (d) Instantiating (b) again with x gives us
x◦ z→ x◦ x∧ x◦ y; since z◦ x, we get x◦ y.
Refl is a theorem of O+. Proof: the result of applying Def< is a first-order tautology.
Trans is a theorem of O+. Proof: the result of applying Def< is a first-order tautology.
SSP is a theorem of O+. Proof: (a) Suppose ¬x < y, for a conditional proof of SSP. (b) By
Def<, there is some z such that z◦ x and ¬z◦ y. (c) So, by Def◦ (which we have already proven is
admissible in O+) there is some w such that w < z and w < x; if we can now show that ¬w◦y, then
we have proven the consequent of SSP, completing our conditional proof. (d) w < z, so by Trans,
every part of w is a part of z; at (b) we learned that ¬z◦ y; using Def◦, that means that no part of z
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Not every pre-ordering, and not every formal system proposed as a mere-
ology,16 admits Def<; such theories cannot be axiomatised with mereological
overlap as a primitive (or not in the standard way). SPO is, in fact, the weakest
mereology to have this feature — if Def< is added directly to Trans, Refl, and
Def◦, the result is SPO.17 This sheds new light on the significance of SSP. What
SSP adds to Trans and Refl — what distinguishes a mereology from any common
or garden pre-ordered set — is the ability to interdefine < and ◦ in the standard
way — the ability to uniquely recover the whole pre-ordering relation from just
the facts about which pairs of elements have some element less than both in the
pre-ordering.
It is also possible to give axiomatic bases for SO, SSO, and SSPO by extending
O+ with axioms containing only ◦. SO may obtained by adding this axiom, the
extensional overlap principle (EOP) to O+:18
(∀z)(z◦ x↔ z◦ y)→ x = y (EOP)
In the context of Def<, EOP is equivalent to ASym.19 So adding EOP to O+
produces SO.
is a part of y; therefore no part of w is a part of y. (e) So, by Def◦ ¬w◦ y; from (c) we got w < x;
so (∃z)(z < x∧¬z◦ y), completing the conditional proof.
ORefl is a theorem of SPO. Proof: the result of applying Def◦ is a consequence of Refl.
OSym is a theorem of SPO. Proof: the result of applying Def◦ is a first-order tautology.
OP is a theorem of SPO. Proof: (a) Suppose that x◦y, for conditional proof. (b) Applying Def◦,
there is some z such that z < x and z < y. If we can now show that (∀w)(w◦ z→ (w◦ x∧w◦ y)),
then we have completed the conditional proof of OP. (c) Suppose, for conditional proof, again, that
w◦ z. Since w◦ z, by Def◦, there is a v such that v < w and v < z. (d) Since z < x and z < y from
(b), by Trans, v < x and v < y. (e) Therefore, by Def◦, w◦x and w◦y (f) Therefore, by conditional
proof, discharging the supposition at (c), (∀w)(w◦ z→ (w◦ x∧w◦ y)), which was all we need to
finish the proof begun at (a).
16Varzi’s (2009) theory MM does not, for example.
17Proof: the proof is the same as the proof that SSP is a theorem of O+ given earlier, since that
proof did not appeal to the axioms of O+, except indirectly via the use of Trans and Def◦. That
shows that the theory whose axioms are Tran, Refl, Def◦, and Def< has SSP as a theorem (and
is thus an extension of SPO). That this theory is no stronger than SPO follows from the fact that
Def< is admissible in SPO.
18And since GSP is already stated in terms of ◦, an axiomatic basis for SSPO may be obtained
by adding GSP to O+; and a basis for SSO by adding both EOP and GSP to O+.
19Proof: applying Def< to ASym results in
(∀z)(z◦ x→ z◦ y)∧ (∀z)(z◦ y→ z◦ x)→ x = y
This is logically equivalent to EOP.
12
3 Coincidence as a mereological concept
In section 2, I defined coincidence as mutual parthood; a move that, while popular,
is also controversial. In this section, I defend that definition. I also address what
appears to be a serious rival view of non-extensional mereology, stemming from
the work of Peter Simons, and presented especially clearly by Achille Varzi, on
which coincidence is not mutual parthood, and on which SSP is false.
I will begin by defending my definition of coincidence. First, I rescind my
definition. Let proper coincidence be a name for a formally undefined concept
that we all understand, the relation that holds between two things when they are,
so to speak, made of the the same stuff. Let strict parthood be the also formally
undefined relation that holds between x and y when x is part of y in an sufficiently
strict sense as to exclude x and y being the same individual and to exclude x and
y properly coinciding. I am going to assume that we have a grasp on those two
concepts without any need for definition, and also that we have a grasp of the
concept of numerical identity, of x and y being one-and-the-same thing.
Now I will introduce some defined terminology. x and y coincide iff either
x and y properly coincide, or are numerically identical. (Only two things can
properly coincide; everything improperly coincides with itself). Let x be a general
part of y iff x is a strict part of y, or x and y coincide.
With “general part” so-defined, it can be proven that x and y coincide iff x and
y are general parts of each other. I take it that (a) the relations of strict parthood,
proper coincidence, and numerical identity are mutually exclusive; (b) that proper
coincidence and numerical identity are symmetric;20 (c) strict parthood is anti-
symmetric. (a) is a matter of conceptual truth — it’s part of what’s meant by
“strict parthood” that it exclude coincidence of any kind, part of what’s meant by
“proper coincidence” that it exclude identity; (b) likewise — if x and y are two
things “made of the same stuff”, then so are y and x; if x and y are one and the
same, then so are y and x. (c) seems marginally less trivial than the others, but still
a conceptual truth: I cannot find any coherent sense in which two things may be
parts of each other without coinciding.21
20It’s important, in this context, to distinguish coincidence (being “made of exactly the same
stuff”) from constitution (which may be ostensively glossed as “the relation that holds between a
statue and the clay it is made of, but not vice versa”). Coincidence is necessary for constitution,
but not sufficient. What it takes, over and above the clay’s coinciding with the statue, for it to
constitute the statue, is beyond the scope of this paper. See Thomson (1998) for a well-developed
theory of constitution. It is of course, coincidence, and not constitution, that I am claiming to be
symmetric.
21Perhaps Sanford’s (1993) example of the Earth and the Aleph is a case in which we imagine
two things to be parts of each other without coinciding. But I am not sure that this example is
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Given the definition of general part, if x and y are general parts of each other,
then x cannot be a strict part of y. Suppose, for reductio, that x and y are general
parts of each other, and that x is a strict part of y . Then y is not a strict part of x,
by (c); but y is a general part of x, so x and y must be either identical or properly
coincident; but then by (b) x is either identical to or properly coincident with y;
therefore by (a) x is not a strict part of y, contradicting our supposition. So if x
and y are general parts of each other, then they coincide (i.e. are either identical
or properly coincident). Conversely, if x and y coincide, they are general parts of
each other (by the definition of general part).
So if “part” means general part, then coincidence is mutual parthood. What
I meant by “part” (and by <) in section 2 was general part, and I will continue
to mean that throughout the rest of this paper. So it was correct of me to define
coincidence in the way I did in section 2.
Since, by definition of “coincide”, two things properly coincide iff they co-
incide and are numerically distinct, our informal primitive, “proper coincidence”
can be defined in terms of general part. If we write x≈ y for “x properly coincides
with y”, then the definition could be formally written as follows:
x≈ y⇔ x < y∧ y < x∧ x 6= y
That concludes the positive case for my definition of coincidence as mutual
parthood. The remainder of this section discusses some senses of “part” other than
general part that interact with “strict part” and “proper coincidence” in different
ways. I use these to resolve a number of equivocations in the literature; and to
resist what would otherwise appear to be a rival and inequivalent definition of
coincidence.
3.1 The danger of equivocation
I have already described two senses of “part”: strict and general part; I now intro-
duce two more. Let x be a classical part of y iff x is a strict part of y or x and y are
numerically identical. (Proper coincidents count as general parts of each other,
but not as classical parts). Let x be a non-identical part of y iff x is a strict part of
y or x and y properly coincide.
Discussions of extensional mereology frequently begin with a distinction be-
tween two senses of “part”: an anti-reflexive sense, which is given the technical
name “proper part”; and a reflexive sense, “proper-or-improper part”. Conven-
tionally, it is the latter that is meant by “part” in the literature on extensional
coherent, and it is certainly very controversial.
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mereology. In a non-extensional setting, however, this distinction between a re-
flexive and an anti-reflexive sense of “part” is insufficient to remove all ambiguity.
I’ve just described four different senses of “part”: two reflexive (general and clas-
sical parthood) and two anti-reflexive (strict and non-identical parthood). It seems
to me that failure to distinguish between the concepts of general and classical part-
hood and between strict and non-identical parthood is at the root of a large amount
of equivocation and verbal disagreement in the literature.
Using the same premises I used to show that proper coincidence is definable
as mutual general parthood, we can see that strict parthood is definable in terms
of general parthood in a distinctive way: x is a strict part of y iff x is a general part
of y but not vice versa. That is, if we write x y for x is a strict part of y:
x y⇔ (x < y)∧ (¬y < x) (PP2)
Proof: Suppose that x is a strict part of y; then x is a general part of y, and y is
neither a strict part of x (strict parthood is anti-symmetric) nor coincident with
x (strict parthood excludes coincidence); therefore y is not a general part of x.
Suppose that x is part of y and not vice versa; then x is not coincident with y (as
coincidence is symmetric); therefore x is a strict part of y.
This is one common way of defining “proper part”; just as popular, however,
is another, inequivalent way:22
x y⇔ (x < y)∧ (x 6= y) (PP1)
The relation defined by PP1 is non-identical part. (I will now write x  y for x
is a non-identical part of y). The difference between the two is simply that two
properly coincident individuals count as non-identical parts of each other, but not
as strict parts of each other.
PP1 and PP2 are often (when distinguished at all!) regarded as two rival def-
initions of one concept of “proper part” and arguments allowed to break out con-
cerning which is the “correct” definition.23 That, however, mistakes a verbal for a
philosophical disagreement. PP1 and PP2 are both the correct definition of their
respective definitienda. The trouble is that the usage of “proper part” in the litera-
ture does not decide which is meant.24
22For a discussion of the use of these definitions in the literature, see Cotnoir (2010, p. 398);
the labels PP1 and PP2 are also his.
23Cotnoir (2010, p. 398-399), for example, argues that PP2 is the “correct” definition. In a
sense, I agree with this — strict parthood is a more useful concept to define! But I think Cotnoir
is fighting a losing battle if he wants to make everyone mean strict parthood by “proper part”.
24In their very interesting paper (2012), Cotnoir and Bacon use “proper part” in yet a third sense,
related to what I call non-identical parthood. Their intended meaning, to judge by their examples,
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It’s easy to understand how this has happened: if we assume that there is no
proper coincidence, then every case of general parthood is a case of classical part-
hood (and vice versa) and every case of strict parthood is a case of non-identical
parthood. Most formal work in mereology has been done in extensional mereol-
ogy, where that assumption is in force. So it is unsurprising that these distinctions
have been neglected. But we should be wary of assuming that a concept that is
univocal in an extensional setting remains so in a non-extensional one.
I consider two case studies of the dangers of equivocation. The first is Peter
Simons’ weak supplementation principle (WSP), which is widely regarded as a
trivial or analytic mereological truth,25 and which is used as an axiom in Casati
and Varzi’s non-extensional Minimal Mereology (MM). (1999, p. 39) In Simons’s
formulation,26 WSP says that if anything has a proper part, then it has another
proper part disjoint from the first.
But what is meant by proper part here? Two versions of WSP, one using strict
parthood, the other non-identical parthood, may be formulated as follows:
x y→ (∃z)(z y∧¬z◦ x) (WSP1)
x y→ (∃z)(z y∧¬z◦ x) (WSP2)
WSP1 is a theorem of SPO, but WSP2 is not (the model of figure 1 is a counter-
model); WSP2 is, however, a theorem of SO, our minimal extensional mereol-
ogy.27 I believe that WSP1 is the trivial or analytic truth intended by Simons;
is that if x is a non-identical part of y, then x is a proper part of y. But not vice versa, because proper
parthood is transitive, according to Cotnoir and Bacon, and neither anti-reflexive nor reflexive.
Some individuals are Cotnoir-Bacon proper parts of themselves and not others. Moreover, their
mereology allows for models that differ only in which individuals are proper parts of themselves;
for example, they would draw a distinction between a model in which there is an unaccompanied
atom which is a proper part of itself, and another model in which that very same unaccompanied
atom is not a proper part of itself. This seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. Cotnoir
and Bacon should strengthen their system to eliminate these pairs of models by adding an axiom to
the effect that if x is a proper part of itself, then there is a y such that x 6= y and x and y are mutually
proper parts of each other. If they did that, then their “proper parthood” would be definable as
follows: x is a Cotnoir-Bacon proper part of y iff (x  y)∨ (x = y∧ (∃z)(x < z∧ z < x∧ x 6= z)).
Special thanks to Andrew Bacon for discussion of this point.
25Considering a counter-model to WSP, Simons says “That goes against what we mean by part”
(Simons 1987, p. 28)
26Casati and Varzi use a different formulation: if x is a proper part of y, then there is a z that is
part of y and disjoint from x. (Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 39)(Varzi 2009) Given the definitions,
Refl, and Trans, this formulation is equivalent to Simons. Simons’s principle entails Casati and
Varzi’s (since every proper part of y is part of y). Casati and Varzi’s entails Simons, since if z is
disjoint from something that overlaps y, z and y cannot be identical and nor can they coincide; so
if z is part of y, z is a proper part of y.
27Proof of WSP1. (a) Suppose for reductio that x y, (∀z)(z y→ z◦x). (b) By the definition
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WSP2 however, is inconsistent with the existence of any properly coincident in-
dividuals. Suppose that x and y properly coincide; the left hand side of WSP2
is satisfied, since properly coincident individuals are non-identical parts of each
other. But the right hand side requires there to be something that is a non-identical
part of y without overlapping x, which is impossible if x and y coincide.
The weak supplementation principle is supposed to be a triviality that would
be a theorem even of a non-extensional mereology; however, it is easy to conflate
it with a much stronger extensionality principle. It’s hard to find this mistake being
made in print,28 though I have heard it made in person.
Second case study: Varzi’s extensionality of parthood principle (EP), that “if
x and y are composite objects with the same proper parts, then x = y” (2008, p.
108). This too is susceptible of two different formulations, depending on what is
meant by “proper part”:
(∃z)(z x)∧ (∀z)(z x↔ z y)→ x = y (EP1)
(∃z)(z x)∧ (∀z)(z x↔ z y)→ x = y (EP2)
The situation here is similar to the situation with WSP — one principle plays
the role intended by its author (in this case EP1) and the other does not (EP2). EP2
is a theorem of SPO29 and can be verified to be satisfied by the model of figure 1,
in which coincidence occurs. Therefore, if extensionality is the impossibility of
coincidence, then EP2 is not an extensionality principle. EP1, on the other hand,
is not a theorem of SPO; it is not satisfied in either the models of figure 1 or figure
2, and it is a theorem of the minimal extensional mereology SO.30
of in terms of <, ¬y < x. (c) By SSP, then, there is some x such that z < y and ¬z◦ x; if we can
show that this z is a strict part of y, then we have a contradiction with (a). (d) y ◦ x (since x y)
but ¬z◦ x (from (c), above); so y and z are not mereologically equivalent; therefore y and z do not
coincide (recall that it is possible to prove in SPO that x and y coincide iff they are mereologically
equivalent); therefore since z < y, z y, so we have the contradiction noted at (c).
It is easy to prove that in SO (but not of course SPO) that x y↔ x y; thus the proof above
can be used to show that WSP2 is a theorem of SO.
28Varzi (2009) claims that Refl, Trans, and WSP entail ASym. He must be mistaken, though,
since the model of figure 1 is a counter-model to this. I suspect that the proof he has in mind
equivocates between WSP1 and WSP2 (the latter of which would indeed entail ASym in company
with Refl and Trans).
29Proof: (a) Suppose that the antecedent of EP2 is satisfied by some x and y. (b) By PPP2,
which we have already seen to be a theorem of SPO, x < y and y < x; so x and y coincide. (c)
However, by definition of, ¬x x, and by (a), x x↔ x y (instantiating (∀z)(z x↔ z y)
with x; so ¬x  y (d) If x and y properly coincide, then x  y; therefore x and y do not properly
coincide. (e) But as we saw at (b) they do coincide, so x = y.
30Proof: as with the proof of WSP2, it is easy to show that in SO, x y↔ x y; thus the proof
of EP2 can be used to show that EP1 is a theorem of SO.
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I believe that EP1 is the extensionality principle that Varzi intended. In both
cases, the charitable interpretation of “proper part” has turned out to be “strict
part”. But in applying this principle, Varzi equivocates.31 He argues that certain
arguments against extensionality fail, because if two things coincide (on the con-
ception of coincidence I am defending) and are thus parts of each other, then they
are proper parts of each other, and thus do not have all and only the same proper
parts, so EP is true. (Varzi 2008, p. 116) This reasoning requires us to under-
stand “proper part” as meaning non-identical part and EP to refer to EP2. Varzi
is right that it would be bad news for the mutual parthood conception of coinci-
dence if mutual parthood were consistent with extensionality. But it is not; mutual
parthood is consistent with EP2 (a mereological triviality), not EP1 (Varzi’s ex-
tensionality principle).
To summarise, here is a table showing all the senses of “part” that I have just
introduced, together with their relationships to the primitive vocabulary:
x y x≈ y x = y
Is x a strict part of y? (x y) yes no no
Is x a non-identical part of y? (x y) yes yes no
Is x a classical part of y? (x y) yes no yes
Is x a general part of y? (x < y) yes yes yes
The elementary logical properties of these concepts (on the assumption that <
satisfies the axioms of SPO) are shown here:32
Strict parthood (x y) anti-reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive
Non-identical parthood (x y) anti-reflexive, non-transitive (!)
Classical parthood (x y) reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive
General parthood (x < y) reflexive, transitive
3.2 Classical parthood and the proper parts conception of co-
incidence
In the previous section, I mentioned Simons’ weak supplementation principle, and
Varzi’s extensionality of parthood principle. These principles play an important
31It’s with great reluctance that I make Varzi my stalking horse in various places in this paper. I
am a great admirer of his work. If I had made as few logical errors as he has, while contributing
as much of value to the literature, I would be very happy.
32The exclamation mark in the table draws attention to the fact that non-identical parthood is,
unlike all the other senses of “part”, non-transitive. Suppose that x and y properly coincide. Then
x y and y x but not x x. Therefore  is not transitive.
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role in what appears to be a rival approach to non-extensional mereology — an
approach that could not be more different from the approach I took in section
2. On this rival approach, coincidence is not regarded as mutual parthood, but
as having all and only the same proper parts. This approach originates in the
early chapters of Simons’s influential book Parts33 and Varzi, in recent work, is
its most explicit defender. The approach embodied in section 2 may be called the
mutual parthood conception of coincidence; the rival view I am now describing
the proper parts conception of coincidence.
Varzi is an extensionalist in mereology; and Simons’ influence is via his pre-
sentation of extensional mereology. They do not explicitly define coincidence;
their adherence to this proper parts conception appears in how they describe which
aspects of their theories make those theories extensional. Simons describes exten-
sionality thus: “by analogy with the extensionality principle of class theory, a
principle which says that if individuals have the same parts they are identical. If
‘part’ meant ‘<’, this would be trivial, so it must here mean ‘proper part’” (1987,
p. 28)34 Simons goes on to say that an additional restatement is needed because
mereological atoms have all and only the same proper parts. So the extensionality
principle must say something like Varzi’s EP: “If x and y are composite objects
with [all and only] the same proper parts, then x = y” (Varzi 2008, p. 108) This
suggests a definition of coincidence in terms of proper parts: x and y coincide iff
x and y are composites and have all and only the same proper parts.
A distinctive feature of this approach is that it regards ASym as a trivial con-
ceptual truth — “a minimal requirement which any relation must satisfy... if it
is to count as parthood at all” (2008, p.110-111). ASym is not, on this view, a
ban on coincidence, because coinciding objects are not parts of each other. SSP,
on the other hand, is regarded as a principle of extensionality.35 An appropriate
axiom set for a non-extensional mereology, on this view, includes Simons’s weak
supplementation principle, together with the partial ordering axioms: Refl, Trans,
ASym, WSP. Indeed, Casati and Varzi propose just this axiom set as their Minimal
Mereology (MM). (1999, p. 39)
33The later chapters of Parts tell a slightly different story; in chapter 6, when discussing tem-
poral mereology, Simons defines coincidence as mutual parthood, and allows for the rejection of
(ASym). (Simons 1987, p. 180) Earlier on, however, he says that it is “trivial” that no two individ-
uals have all and only the same parts (Simons 1987, p. 28) and at least gives the strong impression
that for two individuals to coincide is for them to share all and only the same proper parts (in the
context of stating principles that say that there are no such objects).
34Compare Varzi: “it is also crucial that [the principle of extensionality] is phrased in terms of
proper parts, otherwise the principle would be trivially true” (2008, p. 108)
35Simons devised SSP as a principle that when added to the partial ordering axioms would yield
a minimal extensional mereology. (Simons 1987, p. 31) Casati and Varzi makes similar use of it.
(Casati and Varzi 1999, pp. 39-40)
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MM and SPO are quite different theories, but there is a weird kind of sym-
metry between them. SPO allows the model of figure 1 but not the model of 2;
MM vice-versa. A cynical third-party might suspect that the mutual parthood and
proper parts conceptions of coincidence are debating a psuedo-question — per-
haps either way of fitting coincidence into a mereological theory is equally good;
perhaps the extensionality of SO is equally due to the presence of both ASym and
SSP.
In fact, I think a dissolution of this “debate” is in order, but not of the kind
imagined above. I believe that the mutual parthood and proper parts conceptions
of coincidence are both correct, and that the apparent different between them is
best explained by a terminological conflation of what I have called “general part”
and “classical part”.
I’ve already argued that if “part” means general part, then the mutual parthood
conception of coincidence is provably correct; if “part” means general part, then it
follows from the definition of “general part” that coincidence is mutual parthood.
Defenders of the proper parts conception of coincidence appear to be disagreeing
with this. However, if we interpret them as meaning classical part by “part”, then
what they say is consistent with SPO, and consistent with the definition of coinci-
dence as mutual general parthood. Moreover, that interpretation makes good sense
of three features of the proper parts conception that would otherwise be puzzling
or seemingly unmotivated.
Let us write x  y for “x is a classical part of y”. Recall that x is a classical
part of y iff x is a strict part of y or x and y are numerically identical.
x y⇔ (x y)∨ (x = y) (Def)
First, defenders of the proper parts conception are untroubled by the inequiva-
lence between the two definitions of “proper part”, PP1 and PP2. If “part” means
classical part, then the varying definitions of “proper part” are in fact equivalent,
and always define strict parthood. That is, both of the following definitions are
admissible:
x y⇔ (x y)∧ (x 6= y) (PP1*)
x y⇔ (x y)∧ (¬x y) (PP2*)
That explains well the inattention to the differences between the definitions in the
literature. It also makes good sense of these authors’ use of WSP and EP — if
“part” means classical part, then “proper part” must mean strict part, and so WSP
and EP must be interpreted as WSP1 and EP1, which I have already argued is the
best interpretation of those principles.
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Simons makes “proper part” a primitive, and defines “x is part of or numeri-
cally identical to, y”. (Simons 1987, p. 26) On the assumption that Simons means
strict part by “proper part” (which he must do, given that he thinks that WSP is
analytic), this definition makes “part” mean classical part, not general part.
Second, if “part” means classical part, then it is indeed “trivial” that no two
things have all and only the same “parts”. Let us call (ASym*) the principle that
says that classical parthood is anti-symmetric:
x y∧ y x→ x = y (ASym*)
ASym* is a theorem of SPO,36 and is satisfied even in the model of figure 1.
(A quick way to check Hasse diagrams for satisfaction of principles containing
occurences of  but no occurences of < is to see whether they would satisfy
the corresponding “unstarred” principles containing <, were all horizontal lines
removed from the diagram). So coincidence cannot be defined as mutual classical
parthood and extensionality cannot be regarded as the principle that no two things
have all and only the same classical parts, for precisely the reasons that Simons
and Varzi give.
Third, interpreting “part” as classical part makes sense of these authors’ view
that SSP entails extensionality. Let (SSP*) be the result of reinterpreting SSP
replacing “part” by “classical part”:
x◦∗ y⇔ (∃z)(z x∧ z y)
¬x y→ (∃z)(z x∧¬z◦∗ y) (SSP*)
SSP* is not a theorem of SPO; it fails to be satisfied in the model of figure 1.
However, it is a theorem of SO.37 The starred version of ◦ is needed because SSP
is stated in terms of “overlap”, which is stipulatively defined in terms of “part”; so
if we want to see the effects on SSP of meaning classical part by “part”, we must
revise that stipulative definition too.38
36Proof: it is a consequence of (PP2) that x y→ ¬y x; then Asym* is easily proven via
(Def).
37Proof: it is easily proven that in SO, x y↔ x < y; in that context SSP* is equivalent to SSP.
38The difference between the starred and unstarred versions of ◦ is subtle: in all cases, if x◦∗ y,
then x◦y, but not vice versa. For x◦y but not x◦∗ y to obtain, it must be that x and y be numerically
diverse; that there be some z that both properly coincide with; and that there be nothing that is a
strict part of both. The only way that that can happen is if x and y properly coincide but do not
have any strict parts; that is, a pair of properly coincident mereological atoms would count as ◦ing
but not ◦∗ing each other. Since other pairs of properly coincident individuals would count as ◦∗ing
each other, ◦∗ draws an arbitrary distinction between atoms and composites, and is thus not an
especially useful notion of overlap.
A third version of the strong supplementation principle could be formulated, resembling SSP*
except that ◦∗ is replaced by ◦. This, like SSP*, would be a non-theorem of SPO, but a theorem of
SO.
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In short, if we interpret Simons and Varzi as meaning classical part by their
use of “part”, then not only are the axioms of Casati and Varzi’s minimal mereol-
ogy theorems of SPO39, but much of the surrounding philosophical discussion is
consistent with the view that coincidence is mutual general parthood.
3.3 Atomic coincidence
I would now like to return to the possibility of coinciding mereological atoms
that, as I noted earlier, SPO allows for. Earlier, I raised two issues about this. The
first was the issue of whether it is intuitively plausible that atoms may properly
coincide. I argued that it is no less plausible than proper coincidence of any other
kind. The second was a more tricky conceptual issue, of whether two things that
are parts of themselves, of each other, and of no other thing, should count as mere-
ological atoms. Couldn’t someone say that an atom is something that has no parts
other than itself, and that our two coinciding “atoms” are therefore composite?
We are now in a position to resolve this second issue. It comes down to what
we mean by “mereological atom”. Atoms are normally defined as things that
have no proper parts, but as we have seen, that is ambiguous. Do we mean that
an atom is an individual that has no strict parts, or that an atom is an individual
that has no non-identical parts? I think we should mean the former. Atoms are
the fundamental building blocks of the realm of individuals. If two individuals
properly coincide, have no strict parts, and are all there is, then they are atoms,
for there is nothing more fundamental than either. That favours the definition
of “atom” as “an individual having no strict parts”, which in turn favours my
interpretation of the model of figure 3.
The possibility of atomic coincidence in SPO is connected with an important
fact about classical parthood. Though it is possible to formally define strict part-
hood and proper coincidence in terms of general parthood (which is what I do),
it is not possible to adequately define proper coincidence, coincidence, or general
parthood in terms of classical parthood or strict parthood.
39In our notation, the axioms are:
x x (Refl*)
x y∧ y z→ x z (Trans*)
x y∧ y x→ x = y (ASym*)
x y→ (∃z)(z y∧¬z◦∗ x) (WSP*)
Of these I have explicitly proven only ASym*. WSP* is an easy consequence of WSP1 (which we
have already seen is a theorem of SPO) since ¬z◦ x entails ¬z◦∗ x. The other proofs are also easy
and left to the reader.
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Consider the model of figure 3, in which there are two coinciding atoms, and
another model, in which the same two atoms exist, but do not coincide, as shown
in figure 4.
Figure 4: A model of SPO with two atoms but no coincidence
You may verify that the two atoms stand in all and only the same classical
parthood and strict parthood relationships in both models. (In both models, both
individuals have no strict parts; in both models, both individuals have themselves
and nothing else as a classical part). However, the atoms coincide with and are
general parts of each other in the model of figure 3 but not figure 4. Therefore
coincidence and general parthood are indefinable in terms of classical parthood.
For this reason, it’s not surprising that formal mereological theories using what
I called the proper parts conception of coincidence hardly ever explicitly define
coincidence. The closest they can come is with the definition I suggested in the
previous section, that x and y coincide iff x and y are composites and have all
and only the same proper parts. This explicitly restricts coincidence to holding
between composites, which seems unmotivated; we have now seen that this re-
striction cannot be removed. All the more reason then, to define coincidence as
mutual general parthood.
4 An argument for extensionalism
I remain a convinced extensionalist in mereology; though I can see how to play
the non-extensionalist’s game — and the main task of this paper has been to de-
scribe its rules — it seems to me that the philosophical reasons for playing that
game are unconvincing. To debate the philosophical arguments for and against
extensionality would be beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it does seem to me that there is a kind of formal argument for mereo-
logical extensionalism available, drawing on the conceptual background described
in section 3. Most people who reject extensional mereology do so because they
want to give some kind of explanation of the relation that holds between (e.g.)
statues and the clay they are made of; persons and human bodies; committees and
the fusions of their members. Non-extensionalists identify that relation with what
I’ve called proper coincidence; and frequently say that two things coincide iff they
are parts of each other; or iff they have the same parts.
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But is this any real explanation at all? The mutual parthood conception of
coincidence is an analysis of “coincidence” in terms of “general part”; but it is
only made plausible by the stipulation that coincident individuals are to count as
general parts of each other. The real primitive concepts of this paper are strict part-
hood and proper coincidence; coincidence was not, therefore, analysed in mereo-
logical terms, and I do not see how it can be.
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